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The Weak Nondelegation Doctrine and American 
Trucking Associations v. EPA 
I. INTRODUCTION 
“A marked tendency of modern legislation is to deal with regula-
tory problems by setting forth less frequently in the legislation itself 
the particular rules that shall control.”1 James Landis wrote those 
words in 1938, and they are just as true today as they were then. 
Landis’s statement highlights the conflict underlying the legal and 
political debate over whether Congress should be allowed to pass 
legislation that does not set forth “the particular rules that shall con-
trol.”2 
Congress delegates legislative authority when it refuses to set 
forth controlling rules and requires another branch to do so.3 The 
“strong nondelegation doctrine” prohibits such delegations of legis-
lative authority to another branch.4 This doctrine is a valid constitu-
tional principle, and courts continue to discuss it. However, notwith-
standing the doctrine’s constitutional support and its verbal 
acknowledgement by courts, strong nondelegation, with few excep-
tions, has not actually been applied by courts. Since courts do not 
apply the strong nondelegation doctrine, Congress is allowed to con-
tinue to delegate tremendous decision-making power to the execu-
tive branch. Additionally, because courts have not, do not, and likely 
will not, apply the strong nondelegation doctrine any time soon, it is 
simply unworkable. 
 
 1. JAMES M. LANDIS, THE ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS 68 (1938). 
 2. Id. 
 3. See DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW CONGRESS 
ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION 9 (1993). 
 4. This Note defines strong nondelegation as encompassing two theories. First, the 
traditional strong nondelegation doctrine prohibits all delegations of legislative authority. Sec-
ond, the more modern version of the strong nondelegation doctrine allows some delegations 
of legislative authority, but only when Congress clearly articulates an intelligible principle to 
guide the agency’s exercise of discretion. In addition, for consistency, this Note uses the term 
“nondelegation doctrine” instead of the “delegation doctrine.” Although the two terms gener-
ally refer to the same concept, the nondelegation doctrine is not limited to delegations of legis-
lative authority. This Note concentrates on the doctrine’s application to delegations from the 
legislative to the executive branch. 
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Under the status quo—in which broad delegations of legislative 
authority are upheld—administrative agencies often possess signifi-
cant decision-making discretion, and those agencies sometimes abuse 
the discretion given them. If the only options available to the courts 
were application of the strong nondelegation doctrine or mainte-
nance of the status quo, the status quo would likely prevail, notwith-
standing its associated problems. This is the case because application 
of the strong nondelegation doctrine would require courts to declare 
as unconstitutional many current statutes that delegate legislative 
power. Fortunately, another option exists. 
The so-called “weak nondelegation doctrine” allows Congress to 
delegate legislative authority to an agency if the agency thereafter 
takes action to sufficiently narrow its own discretion under the stat-
ute. For instance, the D.C. Circuit recently decided American Truck-
ing Associations v. EPA (“American Trucking”),5 and held that the 
Environmental Protection Agency’s (“EPA”) interpretation of the 
Clean Air Act (“CAA”) violated the nondelegation doctrine because 
the EPA did not articulate an intelligible principle to limit the discre-
tion given by the CAA.6 The D.C. Circuit applied weak nondelega-
tion in this case as an alternative to strong nondelegation. 
The weak nondelegation doctrine is a desirable alternative to 
strong nondelegation because it does not prevent congressional dele-
gations of legislative power, but it can correct some of the more 
serious problems associated with those delegations. Part II discusses 
the nondelegation doctrine’s background, including its constitu-
tional foundations and the case law that has developed the doctrine. 
Part III examines the American Trucking decision, including a dis-
cussion of the case’s statutory and regulatory context, an examina-
tion of the case’s holding and possible rationales for the holding, and 
an analysis of how the majority’s decision supports the weak non-
delegation doctrine. Part IV examines how weak nondelegation can 
be defended against criticism from both strong nondelegation sup-
porters and nondelegation opponents. It then illustrates how Judge 
Tatel’s American Trucking dissent, as well as the United States Su-
preme Court and D.C. Circuit case law, support weak nondelega-
tion. Finally, it discusses possible practical implications of the Ameri-
 
 5. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), reh’g 
denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 6. See id. 
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can Trucking decision’s application of weak nondelegation. This 
Note concludes that, instead of perpetuating the stalemated argu-
ment over whether strong nondelegation should be resurrected, 
courts should adopt the weak nondelegation doctrine as a workable 
and desirable alternative that can be supported by the Constitution, 
case law, and public policy. 
II. BACKGROUND 
Reasonable arguments support both sides of the nondelegation 
debate. Strong nondelegation supporters argue that delegation of 
legislative authority is unconstitutional and threatens the integrity of 
our federal government. An examination of the Constitution sup-
ports this position. Nondelegation opponents argue that the strong 
doctrine threatens to paralyze civilized society by preventing the fed-
eral government from fulfilling its responsibilities, an argument rec-
ognized by the Supreme Court.7 
In spite of the constitutional arguments for strong nondelega-
tion, the doctrine has, for all intents and purposes, been dormant for 
quite some time. Litigants have long asserted nondelegation claims 
when challenging administrative agency action, but the Supreme 
Court has consistently agreed with the doctrine in principle only.8 
Notwithstanding the Court’s verbal agreement with the theory of 
strong nondelegation, the Court’s holdings have born no relation-
ship to the articulated standards.9 
This section sets forth, first, the constitutional arguments for and 
against the nondelegation doctrine and, second, a brief overview of 
the Supreme Court’s nondelegation case law. This Note does not, 
however, attempt to answer the question of whether the Constitu-
tion actually prohibits delegation of legislative power. 
 
 
 
 
 
 7. See Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 371-72 (1989). 
 8. See, e.g., infra Part II.B. 
 9. See id.; 1 KENNETH CULP DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE § 3:1, at 149 
(2d ed. 1978). 
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A. The Strong Nondelegation Doctrine and the Constitution 
1. The Constitution’s language 
Article I of the United States Constitution establishes the legisla-
tive branch and enumerates that branch’s powers.10 The first section 
of Article I states, “All legislative Powers herein granted shall be 
vested in a Congress of the United States.”11 Article I further states 
that Congress shall have power “[t]o make all Laws which shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Pow-
ers.”12 
Articles II and III establish the executive and judicial branches 
respectively and enumerate the powers granted to those branches.13 
These articles use similar restrictive language: “The executive Power 
shall be vested in a President of the United States of America”14 and 
“[t]he judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one su-
preme Court.”15 This constitutional text shows that (1) specific pow-
ers are given to specific branches of the federal government, and (2) 
since each branch is vested with only its power and not with the 
power of any other branch, these powers should not be shared 
among the branches. 
James Madison’s writings further support these two propositions. 
First, addressing concerns of an overly powerful federal government, 
Madison stated that “[t]he powers delegated by the proposed Con-
stitution to the Federal Government[] are few and defined.”16 If the 
federal government as a whole possesses few and defined powers, 
then the branches within that government must also possess few and 
defined powers. Madison later responded to critics’ arguments that 
the Constitution threatened the nation’s liberty because of the in-
adequate separation of powers between the three branches. Recog-
nizing the threat posed by the consolidation of too much power in 
any one branch, he stated that “[t]he accumulation of all powers leg-
islative, executive and judiciary in the same hands, whether of one, a 
 
 10. See U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 8. 
 11. Id. § 1. 
 12. Id. § 8, cl. 18. 
 13. See id. at arts. II, III. 
 14. Id. at art. II, § 1, cl. 1. 
 15. Id. at art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
 16. THE FEDERALIST NO. 45, at 313 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
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few or many . . . may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyr-
anny.”17 Madison then argued the Constitution does not allow such 
concentration of powers in one branch.18 The Federalist No. 48, argu-
ing for checks and balances, further reinforces the principle that one 
branch should not exercise another branch’s powers.19 
In addition to what the Constitution says on this subject, it is 
also important to note what it does not say. As in all other areas of 
constitutional law, there is ample room for disagreement over 
whether the Constitution necessarily prohibits the delegation of leg-
islative power. Nondelegation opponents are quick to point out that 
the theories previously mentioned are not explicit in the constitu-
tional text. Nondelegation opponents maintain that the Constitution 
contains no “separation of powers” provision, no “nondelegation” 
provision, and no definition of legislative, executive, or judicial pow-
ers.20 
2. Constitutional arguments supporting the strong nondelegation 
doctrine 
Support for the strong nondelegation doctrine focuses primarily 
on the doctrines of enumerated powers and separation of powers. 
The doctrine of enumerated powers holds that the three branches 
derive their power only from the Constitution’s vesting clauses, 
which specifically enumerate what powers are vested in each 
branch.21 Therefore, if the Constitution does not enumerate a power 
in a branch’s vesting clause, then that branch cannot exercise that 
power.22 Under this analysis, the legislative branch cannot delegate 
 
 17. THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, at 324 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). See 
also id. at 325 (quoting Montesquieu that “there can be no liberty where the legislative and 
executive powers are united in the same person, or body of magistrates”); id. at 326 (stating 
that “[t]he magistrate in whom the whole executive power resides cannot of himself make a 
law”). 
 18. See id. at 324-31. 
 19. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 48 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961). 
 20. See, e.g., Gary Lawson, The Rise and Rise of the Administrative State, 107 HARV. L. 
REV. 1231, 1238 (1994). 
 21. See id. at 1238; Gary Lawson, Who Legislates?, 1995 PUB. INTEREST L. REV. 147, 
150-51 (reviewing DAVID SCHOENBROD, POWER WITHOUT RESPONSIBILITY: HOW 
CONGRESS ABUSES THE PEOPLE THROUGH DELEGATION (1993)) [hereinafter Who Legis-
lates?]; see also supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text. 
 22. See Lawson, supra note 20, at 1238; Who Legislates?, supra note 21, at 150-51. See 
generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 155-57 (noting debate at the Constitutional Con-
vention supporting the proposition that the Constitution prohibits delegation). 
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legislative authority since Article I does not enumerate such a 
power.23 By negative implication, since the Constitution vests “[a]ll 
legislative Powers”24 in the legislative branch and does not vest any 
legislative powers in the executive branch, the executive branch can-
not exercise legislative powers delegated to it.25 The separation of 
powers also supports these twin conclusions; because the legislative 
branch is separate from the executive branch, the executive branch 
cannot exercise the legislative branch’s powers.26 
3. Constitutional arguments opposing the strong nondelegation 
doctrine 
Nondelegation opponents primarily criticize the strong nondele-
gation doctrine on functional grounds, but some have challenged 
strong nondelegation’s constitutional basis using the Constitution’s 
text and history. Some opponents, for instance, argue that the Con-
stitution’s language is properly interpreted to authorize delegations, 
that broad delegations of legislative power were common during the 
Framers’ time, and that the Framers did not see any problem with 
such delegations.27 
Opponents also attempt to side step constitutional issues by ar-
guing that administrative agencies do not exercise legislative author-
ity. First, a statute may give an executive agency very broad discre-
tion to issue regulations. Second, the agency may exercise discretion 
and issue those regulations as the statute requires. According to this 
argument, if statutes require agencies to issue regulations and the 
agencies do so, then the agencies have merely executed the law, as 
the Constitution authorizes. Therefore, the agencies have not exer-
cised legislative authority.28 
 
 23. See Lawson, supra note 20, at 1238; Who Legislates?, supra note 21, at 150-51. See 
generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 155-57. 
 24. U.S. CONST. art I, § 1. 
 25. See SOTIRIOS A. BARBER, THE CONSTITUTION AND THE DELEGATION OF 
CONGRESSIONAL POWER 37 (1975) (arguing that the primary support for the nondelegation 
doctrine should be constitutional supremacy and “the simple expectation . . . that neither the 
government nor any of its parts should change the constitutional arrangement of offices and 
powers”); Lawson, supra note 20, at 1238; Who Legislates?, supra note 21, at 150-51. Note 
that Barber’s conclusion is reinforced by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, which enu-
merates the legislative powers Congress is authorized to perform. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. 
 26. See BARBER, supra note 25, at 37. 
 27. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:4. 
 28. See Who Legislates?, supra note 21, at 151-52. 
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B. The Evolution of Nondelegation Case Law 
Time and time again, the Supreme Court has reiterated that the 
Constitution prohibits the delegation of legislative authority. The 
Court has repeatedly stated there are limits on the amount of discre-
tion that Congress can grant to executive agencies. But despite the 
sometimes-forceful language, the Court has repeatedly refused to 
hold broad grants of authority unconstitutional.29 While this discus-
sion does not attempt to exhaustively analyze the historical case law, 
a fairly clear picture can be obtained from the relatively few cases that 
follow. 
1. The pre–New Deal era 
a. Phase I: Denial that a delegation has taken place. Near the end 
of the nineteenth century, after upholding several fairly broad dele-
gations,30 the Supreme Court decided Field v. Clark.31 The statute in 
question authorized the President to suspend Tariff Act provisions 
and impose duties on foreign nations upon finding that the foreign 
nation imposed unequal and unreasonable duties on American 
goods. The statute defined neither “unequal” nor “unreasonable.” 
The Field opinion contains some of the Court’s most well-
known and most forceful nondelegation statements. For example, 
the Court stated, “That Congress cannot delegate legislative power 
to the President is a principle universally recognized as vital to the 
integrity and maintenance of the system of government ordained by 
the Constitution.”32 
More important than the Court’s strong language, however, is 
the consistency of the holding with prior and subsequent cases. As 
the Court had so often done previously, it held that the statute did 
not unconstitutionally delegate but did not explain why.33 So, ac-
cording to Field, determining whether a foreign country’s tariffs are 
 
 29. There is, of course, room to argue whether many statutes actually delegate legisla-
tive power, but this Note assumes that many statutes do delegate because (1) even nondelega-
tion opponents agree that many statutes delegate, and (2) the inquiry as to whether an im-
proper delegation exists is not as important under weak nondelegation. See DAVIS, supra note 
9, § 3:1 at 149-50 (stating that the Supreme Court “has upheld congressional delegations 
without standards”). 
 30. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:4, at 158-59. 
 31. 143 U.S. 649 (1892). 
 32. Id. at 692. 
 33. See id. at 692-93. 
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unequal or unreasonable is not an exercise of legislative power, even 
without any standards indicating what unequal and unreasonable 
mean. 
b. Phase II: Recognition of “acceptable” delegations.34 In J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. v. United States,35 the Supreme Court changed 
the way that it addressed nondelegation cases. Like Field, J.W. 
Hampton, Jr. & Co. involved a statute authorizing the President to 
adjust tariff rates upon determining that adjustments were necessary 
to compensate for low foreign production costs. The Court, as al-
ways, reaffirmed the nondelegation doctrine’s lofty purpose of pre-
serving the integrity of the three branches of the federal govern-
ment.36 The Court then announced that “[i]f Congress shall lay 
down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or 
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legisla-
tive action is not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”37 Al-
though the Court’s prior holdings, including Field, clearly commu-
nicated that Congress could delegate to executive officials the power 
to make policy decisions with little or no statutory guidance, this was 
the first time the Court explicitly acknowledged the acceptability of 
some delegations of legislative authority.38 The Court therefore au-
thorized Congress to delegate as long as it limited the delegatee’s 
discretion by providing the delegatee with an intelligible principle to 
guide the exercise of delegated legislative power. 
It would be reasonable to expect that this new, more lenient 
formulation would allow the Court to actually enforce in deed a 
principle that it so often supported only in word. But, with the ex-
ception of two cases during the New Deal era, the Court has stead-
fastly refused to actually apply the nondelegation doctrine and has 
often not even required an intelligible principle.39 
 
 34. The acceptance of certain delegations of legislative authority is contrary to the tradi-
tional strong nondelegation doctrine. This Note, however, does not distinguish this “intelligi-
ble principle” formulation from the traditional strong nondelegation doctrine for two reasons. 
First, both the traditional and the modern strong nondelegation doctrines place the primary 
responsibilities on Congress, while the weak nondelegation doctrine places responsibilities on 
the agency itself. Second, arguments favoring weak nondelegation apply equally whether we 
compare it to the traditional or the modern strong nondelegation doctrine. 
 35. 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
 36. See id. at 406. 
 37. Id. at 409 (emphasis added). 
 38. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 35-36. 
 39. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:5. 
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2. The New Deal era 
The New Deal brought with it the National Industrial Recovery 
Act (“NIRA”) and two central nondelegation cases, Panama Refin-
ing Co. v. Ryan40 and A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United 
States.41 These cases support strong nondelegation claims that the 
Court can and should strike down impermissible delegations of legis-
lative power.42 Yet, for nondelegation opponents, these cases repre-
sent only anomalies, holdings unsupported by prior or subsequent 
case law and lending little or no support to the strong nondelegation 
doctrine.43 
In Panama Refining Co., petroleum producers challenged an ex-
ecutive action taken pursuant to section 9(c) of the NIRA. Section 
9(c) authorized the President to regulate interstate and foreign 
transportation of petroleum products “withdrawn from storage in 
excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from 
storage by any state law.”44 According to the Court, section 9(c) 
gave “to the President an unlimited authority to determine the pol-
icy and to lay down the prohibition, or not to lay it down, as he may 
see fit.”45 The Court determined that the statute contained nothing 
that “limit[ed] or control[led] the authority conferred by § 9(c).”46 
The Court ultimately concluded that it was impossible to derive 
from the statute an intelligible principle that limited the President’s 
discretion and therefore held that the statute unconstitutionally 
 
 40. 293 U.S. 388 (1935). 
 41. 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
 42. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 37-40. 
 43. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:8. 
 44. Panama Ref. Co., 293 U.S. at 406 (quoting 48 Stat. 195, 200, which states: 
(c) The President is authorized to prohibit the transportation in interstate and for-
eign commerce of petroleum and the products thereof produced or withdrawn from 
storage in excess of the amount permitted to be produced or withdrawn from stor-
age by any state law or valid regulation or order prescribed thereunder, by any 
board, commission, officer, or other duly authorized agency of a State. Any violation 
of any order of the President issued under the provisions of this subsection shall be 
punishable by fine of not to exceed $1,000, or imprisonment for not to exceed six 
months, or both.). 
 45. Id. at 415. Namely, the Court concluded that the statute qualified the President’s 
discretion in no way, provided no guidance as to the circumstances or conditions in which the 
President was to exercise the power, provided “no criterion to govern the President’s course,” 
did “not require any finding by the President as a condition of his action,” and “declare[d] no 
policy” to guide the exercise of power. Id. 
 46. Id. at 419. 
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delegated legislative authority.47 The Court noted, in dicta, that if an 
intelligible principle could be derived through a reasonable interpre-
tation of the statute, then the President would be required to act 
within those limits and the statute would be saved.48 
A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. addressed section 3 of the NIRA. 
Section 3 authorized the President to establish “codes of fair compe-
tition” in trades or industries when the President made certain find-
ings.49 These codes were authorized “for the protection of consum-
ers, competitors, employees, and others, and in furtherance of the 
public interest.”50 
Acting under section 3, the President established the “Live Poul-
try Code.”51 The Court first asked “whether Congress . . . has itself 
established the standards of legal obligation, thus performing its es-
sential legislative function, or, by the failure to enact such standards, 
has attempted to transfer that function to others.”52 The Court next 
examined the supposed statutory constraints on the President’s pow-
ers.53 In the Court’s opinion, the statutory requirements served only 
as prerequisites to the codes’ operation and not as limitations on the 
President’s discretion.54 The statute authorized the President to issue 
codes to rehabilitate industries but gave no guidance as to what 
codes should be established or what industries should be regulated 
under those codes.55 The Court therefore held that the statute un-
constitutionally delegated legislative power.56 
Other than these two cases, the Court’s case law throughout the 
New Deal era continued the trend illustrated by J.W. Hampton, Jr. 
& Co., in which broad delegations were upheld despite the often-
questionable existence of any intelligible principle.57 
 
 47. See id. at 431-33. 
 48. See id. at 431. 
 49. See A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, 521-22 (1935). 
 50. Id. at 523 (quoting Act of June 16, 1933, c. 90, 48 Stat. 195, 196). 
 51. Id. at 521, 523-25. 
 52. Id. at 530. 
 53. See id. at 538. The Court determined that the statute required the President to find 
the groups that urge the President to enact regulations “‘impose no inequitable restrictions on 
admission to membership’ and are ‘truly representative’” and that the code will not “‘promote 
monopolies or . . . eliminate or oppress small enterprises.’” Id. (citing 48 Stat. 195, 196). 
 54. See id. 
 55. See id. at 541-42. 
 56. See id. 
 57. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:5. 
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3. The post–New Deal era 
World War II brought the end of the New Deal era but not the 
end of the Court upholding broad delegations of legislative power. 
In Yakus v. United States,58 the Court addressed whether the Emer-
gency Price Control Act of 1942 (“EPCA”) unconstitutionally dele-
gated legislative power to the Price Administrator to fix maximum 
prices of rents and commodities during World War II in order to ef-
fectuate the purposes of the EPCA. The Court, in conclusory fash-
ion, held that no unconstitutional delegation existed and stated that 
Congress had provided “the legislative objective, . . . prescribed the 
method of achieving that objective—maximum price fixing—,[sic] 
and . . . laid down standards to guide the administrative determina-
tion.”59 
Later, in Lichter v. United States,60 the Court examined whether 
the Renegotiation Act unconstitutionally delegated to the Secretary 
of War, the Secretary of the Navy, and the Chairman of the Maritime 
Commission the power to renegotiate wartime contracts with private 
contractors. The Act authorized the administrators to direct renego-
tiation when, in their opinion, a contract had or would result in ex-
cessive profits. The Act gave no definition of excessive profits. The 
Court held that the Renegotiation Act did not unconstitutionally 
delegate.61 In reaching that holding, the Court heavily emphasized 
the importance of giving Congress and the President sufficient lee-
way to protect the nation in times of war.62 
 
 
 
 
 
 58. 321 U.S. 414 (1944). 
 59. Id. at 423 (The EPCA’s purpose was “to stabilize prices and to prevent speculative, 
unwarranted, and abnormal increases in prices and rents; to eliminate and prevent profiteer-
ing . . . ; to assure that defense appropriations are not dissipated by excessive prices; to protect 
persons with relatively fixed and limited incomes . . . ; to prevent hardships to persons engaged 
in business . . .” Id. at 420 (citation omitted).). 
 60. 334 U.S. 742 (1948). 
 61. See id. at 787. 
 62. See id. at 778-82. 
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4. The modern approach 
Although there are several modern nondelegation cases,63 Mis-
tretta v. United States64 adequately illustrates the modern state of the 
law. In Mistretta, the Supreme Court addressed whether the Sen-
tencing Reform Act of 1984 (“SRA”) unconstitutionally delegated 
legislative power to the United States Sentencing Commission 
(“Sentencing Commission”). The SRA authorized the Sentencing 
Commission to establish sentencing guidelines that would be bind-
ing upon federal courts.65 
The Court, as usual, paid homage to the strong nondelegation 
doctrine but then noted that delegation was not entirely prohibited 
and “‘must be fixed according to common sense and the inherent 
necessities of the government co-ordination.’”66 The Court reaf-
firmed that the critical inquiry is whether the statute articulates an 
intelligible principle to guide the delegatee’s decision making.67 Im-
portantly, Mistretta explicitly endorses Congress’s ability to delegate 
by stating that “Congress simply cannot do its job absent an ability 
to delegate power under broad general directives.”68 The Court also 
enumerated the statutory limitations on the Sentencing Commis-
sion’s discretion. For instance, Congress outlined in the SRA the 
Commission’s goals, the purposes of sentencing, the means of regu-
lating sentencing, the limitations on the guidelines, and the factors 
to consider in setting the guidelines.69  
III. AMERICAN TRUCKING ASSOCIATIONS 
To understand the importance of American Trucking, this sec-
tion will discuss: first, the decision’s statutory and regulatory context; 
second, the holding; third, alternative rationales for the holding; 
and, finally, how the decision supports weak nondelegation. 
 
 63. See, e.g., Federal Power Comm’n v. New England Power Co., 415 U.S. 345 (1974); 
National Cable Television Ass’n v. United States, 415 U.S. 336 (1974); United States v. 
Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968). 
 64. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 65. See id. at 367. 
 66. Id. at 372 (quoting J.W. Hampton Jr. & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 406 
(1928)). 
 67. See id. 
 68. Id. 
 69. See id. at 374-76. 
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A. The Statutory and Regulatory Context of American Trucking 
Associations 
1. The Clean Air Act 
At issue in American Trucking were national ambient air quality 
standards (“NAAQS”) promulgated by the EPA.70 The EPA issued 
those regulations pursuant to sections 108 and 109 of the Clean Air 
Act (“CAA”).71 
First, CAA section 108 authorizes the EPA to create and update 
a list of air pollutants that “cause or contribute to air pollution which 
may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare.”72 After including a pollutant in the list, the statute directs the 
EPA to establish “[a]ir quality criteria” that “reflect the latest scien-
tific knowledge” and that indicate “the kind and extent of all identi-
fiable effects on public health or welfare” caused by that pollutant.73 
Next, CAA section 109 authorizes the EPA to establish primary 
and secondary NAAQS for air pollutants on the section 108 list.74 
The CAA orders the EPA to establish and revise primary and secon-
dary NAAQS based on the section 108 criteria.75 The statute re-
quires the primary NAAQS to be “requisite to protect the public 
health” with “an adequate margin of safety.”76 Secondary NAAQS 
must be based on the criteria and be “requisite to protect the public 
welfare from any known or anticipated adverse effects associated 
with” the pollutant’s presence.77 Section 109 gives the EPA no other 
guidance in the exercise of its discretion in establishing NAAQS. 
In addition, section 109 also requires the EPA to review and re-
vise the existing section 108 criteria and NAAQS at least every five 
years.78 The EPA must also add new pollutants to the section 108 list 
and establish NAAQS for those pollutants as deemed necessary.79 
 
 70. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1033 (D.C. Cir.) (per cu-
riam), reh’g denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 71. See id. 
 72. 42 U.S.C. § 7408(a)(1)(A) (1994). 
 73. Id. § 7408(a)(2). 
 74. See id. § 7409(a). 
 75. See id. § 7409(b)(1). 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. § 7409(b)(2). 
 78. See id. § 7409(d)(1). 
 79. See id. 
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2. The EPA’s ozone and particulate matter final rules 
After a 1993 lawsuit challenging the EPA’s failure to comply 
with the section 109 requirement to review and revise NAAQS every 
five years, the EPA revised the primary and secondary NAAQS for 
particulate matter (“PM”) and ozone.80 The EPA issued the final PM 
and ozone NAAQS in July 1997 (“PM final rule” and “ozone final 
rule”) pursuant to sections 108 and 109.81 
The EPA began regulating PM in 1971 and established a more 
stringent standard in 1987.82 The 1997 PM final rule established and 
regulated a new category of particulate matter, PM 2.5 (particulate 
matter with a diameter of less than 2.5 microns).83 
The EPA began indirectly regulating ozone in 1971 and prom-
ulgated less stringent standards specifically addressing ozone in 
1979.84 The 1997 ozone final rule’s requirements were more strin-
gent than the 1979 standard. The ozone final rule required ozone 
concentrations lower than 0.08 part per million (ppm) averaged over 
an eight hour period instead of the older standard, which required 
0.12 ppm averaged over a one hour period.85 
 
 80. See American Lung Ass’n v. Browner, 884 F. Supp. 345 (D. Ariz. 1994); Brief of 
Non–State Petitioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality Standards at 7, 
American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA (No. 97-1440); Lucinda Minton Langworthy, EPA’s New 
Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter and Ozone: Boon for Health or Threat to the Clean 
Air Act?, 28 ENVTL. L. REP. 10,502, 10,503 (1998); A. Tina Batra & Marcia C. Sugrue, 
Note, EPA’s Not-So-Final Rules: Congress’ Attack on EPA’s New Ozone and Particulate Matter 
Rules, 4 ENVTL. LAW. 611, 613 (1998). 
 81. See National Ambient Air Quality Standards for Particulate Matter, 62 Fed. Reg. 
38,652 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50); National Ambient Air Quality Standards 
for Ozone, 62 Fed. Reg. 38,856 (1997) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 50). 
 82. See Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards at 5, American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA (No. 97-1440) (stating that 1971 
standards regulated particles of less that 45-50 microns in diameter and that 1987 standards 
regulated particles less than 10 microns in diameter); Langworthy, supra note 80, at 10,503 
(explaining the progression from the initial PM standards (regulating total suspended particles 
(“TSP”)) to standards regulating particles less than 10 microns in diameter (PM10)). 
 83. See Batra & Sugrue, supra note 80, at 613. The “short-term” primary standard lim-
its the “24-hour average ambient PM2.5 concentrations to no more than 65 micrograms per 
cubic meter.” Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards at 9, American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA (No. 97-1440). The primary “long-
term” standard limits “annual average concentrations to” 15 micrograms per cubic meter. Id. 
at 10. The “EPA also established PM2.5 standards equal to the primary standards.” Id. at 22. 
 84. See Langworthy, supra note 80, at 10,503-04. 
 85. See id. For a discussion focusing on the ozone standards, see generally F. William 
Brownell & Ross S. Antonson, Implementing the New Eight-Hour NAAQS for Ozone—What 
Happened to the 1990 Clean Air Act?, 11 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 355 (1998). 
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The EPA claimed the new standards would potentially “prevent 
as many as 15,000 premature deaths, and hundreds of thousands of 
cases of significantly decreased lung function in children” each year.86 
The EPA, however, did not consider the economic costs of attaining 
the ozone and PM NAAQS when deciding to adopt the standards.87 
Although these costs played no role in the EPA’s decision, EPA es-
timates place the implementation costs of the PM standards at $37 
billion per year and the costs of the ozone standards at $9.6 billion 
per year.88 Less optimistic estimates placed the annual implementa-
tion costs for both standards at $80 to $150 billion per year.89 Along 
with the direct monetary costs, some predicted that the new stan-
dards would cause significant unemployment and other economic 
hardships.90 
The American Trucking petitioners challenged the ozone and 
PM final rules by asserting that the CAA unconstitutionally dele-
gated legislative power to the EPA. 
B. The American Trucking Associations Decision 
1. The court’s holding 
The D.C. Circuit did not declare that sections 108 and 109 of 
the CAA unconstitutionally delegated legislative power. The court 
instead held only that the EPA’s interpretation of those sections 
“render[ed] them unconstitutional delegations of legislative 
power.”91 The court identified as the primary problem the EPA’s 
 
 86. Testimony of Carol M. Browner Administrator United States Environmental Protec-
tion Agency Before the Subcommittees on Health and Environment and Oversight and Investiga-
tions of the Committee on Commerce United States House of Representatives (visited Nov. 1, 
1999) <http://www.wienviro.com/r71001a.txt> (stating other benefits, including “reduced 
cancer from air toxics reductions [and] reduced adverse effects on vegetation, forests, and 
natural ecosystems . . . . Estimated total monetized health and public welfare benefits . . . 
rang[e] in the tens of billions of dollars annually.”). 
 87. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1040 (D.C. Cir.) (per cu-
riam), reh’g denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 88. See Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards at 3, American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA (No. 97-1440); Langworthy, supra 
note 80, at 10,505-06. 
 89. See Batra & Sugrue, supra note 80, at 615; Langworthy, supra note 80, at 10,505-
06. 
 90. See Langworthy, supra note 80, at 10,505-06. 
 91. American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1034. 
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failure to indicate any criteria for determining “how much is too 
much” ozone or PM.92 The court remanded to the agency, giving 
the EPA an opportunity to save the statute by formulating an inter-
pretation that articulates an intelligible principle for identifying un-
safe levels of these pollutants.93 
2. Alternative interpretations of the rationale for this decision 
a. The traditional interpretation: The EPA did not articulate an 
intelligible principle to guide its discretion in setting the ozone and PM 
standards. According to the court, the EPA failed to identify the 
principle on which the agency based its decision to select the final 
ozone and PM levels.94 The court accepted the criteria the EPA used 
to determine the health effects of various ozone and PM concentra-
tions, but faulted the EPA for failing to adequately define what level 
is too high, based on those factors.95 The court found the rationale 
provided by the EPA could justify almost any standard the EPA 
wished to set.96 The court reasoned that the EPA has too much dis-
cretion if it is free to choose between a slightly-above-zero standard 
and a deadly-to-a-large-number-of-people standard.97 The EPA must 
explain the reason why it should select “this” level and not “that” 
level.98 The court recognized that the EPA could use its criteria to 
explain the health effects of ozone at 0.01 ppm, 0.05 ppm, and 0.10 
ppm, however, the EPA did not explain which level is “requisite to 
protect the public health” with an “adequate margin of safety” and 
why another level is not.99 
 
 92. Id.  
 93. See id. at 1033-34. 
 94. See id. at 1034. It is beyond this Note’s scope to analyze whether an unconstitu-
tional delegation actually existed in this case, to justify the majority’s decision, or to advocate a 
framework for determining the existence of an unconstitutional delegation. For a discussion on 
an analytical model for identifying unconstitutional delegations, see generally BARBER, supra 
note 25, at 43-44; SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 180-91; David Schoenbrod, The Delegation 
Doctrine: Could the Court Give it Substance?, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1223, 1249-58 (1985) [here-
inafter Schoenbrod, Could the Court Give it Substance]. But see Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Political 
Accountability and Delegated Power: A Response to Professor Lowi, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 391, 
398-403 (1987). 
 95. See American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1034, 1036. 
 96. See id. 
 97. See id. 
 98. Id. 
 99. 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994) (quoted in American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 
1034). 
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Judge Tatel took issue with the majority’s conclusion.100 In his 
dissent, Tatel first offered examples of extremely broad delegations, 
ones broader than the CAA, which the Supreme Court has upheld.101 
He then challenged the majority’s conclusion that no intelligible 
principle guided the EPA’s choice of ozone and PM standards.102 
b. An alternative interpretation: The nondelegation doctrine was a 
convenient tool to send the EPA a message. Over the past several years, 
the EPA has received criticism from various parties. Most signifi-
cantly, critics have alleged that the agency has placed politics ahead 
of science.103 Although probably not the principal rationale behind 
the decision, perhaps the court wanted to send the EPA a warning 
that it should improve its practices. Perhaps the nondelegation doc-
trine simply provided the court with the right tool in the right situa-
tion. 
First, Judge Tatel, in his dissent, alluded that something more 
than pure legal theory compelled the majority’s holding. He referred 
to the petitioners’ claims that the “EPA arbitrarily selected the stud-
ies it relied upon or drew mistaken conclusions from those stud-
ies.”104 Tatel also stated, citing the majority’s opinion, that the non-
delegation analysis does not address “whether EPA failed to live up 
to the principles it established for itself.”105 These statements indicate 
Tatel’s recognition that the majority saw some potentially improper 
behavior on the part of the EPA and that the majority might have 
taken that into consideration in making their decision. 
Second, the American Trucking petitioners, a group made up 
mostly of manufacturing and industry interests, included concerns 
about the EPA’s practices in their briefs. The Brief of Non-State Peti-
 
 100. See American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1057 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 101. See id. at 1057-58. 
 102. Tatel argued that the EPA had articulated a principle because the EPA “set the 
ozone level just above peak background concentrations where the most certain health effects 
are not transient and reversible, and the fine particle level at the lowest long-term mean con-
centration observed in studies that showed a statistically significant relationship between fine 
particle pollution and adverse health effects.” Id. at 1061. 
 103. See Gary Lee, Agency Takes a Hit From One of Its Own, WASH. POST, June 27, 
1996, at A27; Science’s Belated Complaint, WALL ST. J., June 7, 1999, at A22; Bonner R. 
Cohen, The People v. Carol Browner: EPA on Trial (visited Oct. 6, 1999) 
<http://www.nwi.org/SpecialStudies/EPAReport/EPAstudy.html>; David L. Lewis, EPA 
Science Versus Carol Browner (visited Nov. 2, 1999) <http://www.nwi.org/SpecialStud-
ies/EPAReport/ DrLewis.html>. 
 104. American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1061 (Tatel, J., dissenting). 
 105. Id. 
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tioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air Quality 
Standards referred to actions and failures by the EPA that raise ques-
tions about the integrity of the agency’s science. For instance, the 
petitioners questioned the EPA’s ability to promulgate scientifically 
credible standards when faced with the severe time constraints under 
which the agency operated in this case.106 The petitioners specifically 
referred to the Clean Air Scientific Advisory Committee’s 
(“CASAC”) reservations about the PM standards’ scientific basis.107 
The petitioners criticized the EPA’s alleged failure to adequately ad-
dress the possibility that pollutants other than PM had caused the 
health effects seen in the studies that the EPA relied on.108 Of addi-
tional concern to the petitioners was the EPA’s alleged failure to re-
veal the data underlying the studies on which the agency based its 
decisions. The petitioners claimed that the data should be revealed to 
allow private reanalysis to determine the studies’ credibility.109 If 
true, the petitioners’ allegations raise serious questions about the 
EPA’s scientific practices. 
Third, it is not just the usual suspects that have alleged EPA im-
proprieties. David Lewis, a former senior EPA researcher, has spoken 
out against his former employer. Lewis claims that the EPA issues 
regulations based on questionable science.110 Lewis alleges that often 
administrators will decide to issue a regulation and then expect scien-
tists to justify their decision.111 
In addition, the National Wilderness Institute (“NWI”), a pro-
environmental organization, published a report detailing several in-
stances of alleged EPA misconduct. The report alleges that the EPA 
used improper lobbying efforts, used delay tactics to avoid disclosing 
information to Congress, persecuted and manipulated agency em-
ployees, submitted fabricated factual analyses to a federal court, and 
issued regulations without adequate scientific basis.112 The NWI’s 
report refers to a 1992 study by the Science Advisory Board 
(“SAB”), a panel established by the EPA. It quotes the SAB study 
 
 106. See Brief of Non-State Petitioners on Fine Particulate Matter National Ambient Air 
Quality Standards, at 7-9, American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA (No. 97-1440). 
 107. See id. 
 108. See id. at 14-17. 
 109. See id. at 18-22. 
 110. See Lewis, supra note 103. 
 111. See id. 
 112. See Cohen, supra note 103. 
CLA-FIN.DOC 5/20/00  11:15 AM 
627] American Trucking Associations v. EPA 
 645 
saying that the “EPA has not always ensured that contrasting, repu-
table scientific views are well-explored and well-documented from 
the beginning to the end of the regulatory process.”113 The NWI’s 
report also quotes the SAB study saying that “[s]cience should never 
be adjusted to fit policy . . . . Yet a perception exists that EPA lacks 
adequate safeguards to prevent this from occurring.”114 Lewis has 
stated that this situation persists under EPA Administrator Carol 
Browner.115 
Although speculative, it is possible that the majority saw some 
truth to these allegations. If so, the majority would have greater in-
centive to use the nondelegation doctrine to require the EPA to 
come forward with a valid scientific basis for the ozone and PM 
standards. Requiring the EPA to reveal the standards on which their 
decision was based makes it more difficult for the agency to engage 
in underhanded tactics that may have influenced prior decisions. 
3. The majority’s decision supports the weak nondelegation doctrine 
The strong nondelegation doctrine places on Congress the bur-
dens of not delegating legislative authority or providing an intelligi-
ble principle when they do delegate. The American Trucking deci-
sion does not apply the strong nondelegation doctrine. The court 
did not declare the statute unconstitutional, did not require Con-
gress to pass a statute that does not delegate legislative authority, 
and did not require Congress to pass a statute clearly articulating an 
intelligible principle. The court instead required that the agency 
formulate its own intelligible principle.116 By placing on the agency 
 
 113. Id. (quoting SAB, Safeguarding the Future: Credible Science, Credible Decisions, 
Mar. 1992). 
 114. Id. See also Science’s Belated Complaint, supra note 103, at A22. 
 115. See Science’s Belated Complaint, supra note 103, at A22. 
 116. Note also that the approach in American Trucking differs from the approach in In-
dustrial Union Department v. American Petroleum Institute, 448 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1980) 
(plurality opinion) (“Benzene”). In Benzene, the Court did not require that the agency provide 
an intelligible principle through a reasonable statutory interpretation. The Court held that the 
Occupational Safety and Health Act (“OSH Act”) required the Secretary of Labor to find that 
a toxic substance posed a significant risk before issuing regulations under section 3(8). Id. The 
Benzene court thus proffered its own reasonable statutory interpretation and articulated an in-
telligible principle to guide OSHA’s discretion. See id. at 645-46. Benzene, however, was de-
cided before Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 
(1984). The Chevron Doctrine now precludes a court from initially imposing its own statutory 
interpretation of an ambiguous statute on an agency that administers the statute. See id. at 842. 
Weak nondelegation allows those agencies to articulate an intelligible principle when the stat-
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the burden of articulating the intelligible principle, the majority’s 
opinion supports the weak nondelegation doctrine. 
Several statements in the opinion support the proposition that 
the court applied weak instead of strong nondelegation. First, the 
court recognized that by requiring the agency to articulate an intelli-
gible principle their approach it did not “‘ensure[] . . . that impor-
tant choices of social policy are made by Congress.’”117 Requiring 
Congress to articulate an intelligible principle, as strong nondelega-
tion does, would ensure that Congress made those choices. Second, 
the majority stated that their approach avoids “hold[ing] unconstitu-
tional a statute that an agency, with the application of its special ex-
pertise, could salvage.”118 The court demanded articulation of an in-
telligible principle to save the statute, and this statement indicates 
that the agency, not just Congress, may articulate that principle. 
Third, the majority stated that they did “not read current Supreme 
Court cases as applying the strong form of the non-delegation doc-
trine.”119 
On the other hand, one could argue that the court did apply 
strong nondelegation. The court required the agency to articulate an 
intelligible principle; but since that principle is referred to as a rea-
sonable interpretation of the statute, it is arguable that Congress ac-
tually articulated the principle by passing a statute susceptible to such 
an interpretation. Acknowledging the creativity exhibited in statutory 
interpretation probably gives Congress credit for something they did 
not actually do. Although the intelligible principle must be a reason-
 
ute they administer leaves them with broad discretion. Therefore, weak nondelegation squares 
with the Chevron Doctrine by giving administering agencies an opportunity to articulate a 
principle rather than allowing courts to provide one themselves. Judge Silberman, however, 
argued that if a statute actually violated the Constitution by delegating legislative authority, 
then a court could most likely strike down the statute without offending the Chevron Doc-
trine. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Silber-
man, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), denying reh’g, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (per curiam). This Note, however, could not possibly undertake a comprehensive analy-
sis of the relationship between weak nondelegation, the Chevron Doctrine, and traditional ju-
dicial review of agency decision making. 
 117. American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1038 (quoting Industrial Union Dep’t, 448 
U.S. at 685). 
 118. Id. (emphasis added). 
 119. Id. This statement by the D.C. Circuit might be interpreted to mean that it did not 
believe the Supreme Court has applied pre–J.W. Hampton, Jr. & Co. strong nondelegation, 
but that interpretation is unreasonable because it has not been an issue since the early twenti-
eth century. 
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able interpretation of the statute, the court recognized that the CAA 
is terribly vague, that it confers on the agency nearly unlimited dis-
cretion, and that the only hope to avoid declaring the statute uncon-
stitutional was for the EPA itself to provide a principle, consistent 
with the CAA, that limited the agency’s own discretion. It would be 
too much of a stretch, however, to say that because this principle is 
consistent with the CAA, Congress actually articulated the principle. 
The most likely conclusion is that the American Trucking major-
ity applied weak nondelegation. Therefore, Part IV analyzes the ar-
guments for and against weak nondelegation, the judicial support for 
weak nondelegation, and the practical consequences of the American 
Trucking decision. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
A. Arguments For and Against Weak Nondelegation 
The American Trucking majority applied weak instead of strong 
nondelegation.120 Application of strong nondelegation would have 
led the court to hold section 109 of the CAA unconstitutional. The 
court refused to take that step and instead remanded to the agency, 
asking the agency to provide the intelligible principle.121 
Weak nondelegation is susceptible to attack from two sides—
from strong nondelegation supporters and from nondelegation crit-
ics. Strong nondelegation supporters argue that weak nondelegation 
is unacceptable because it allows Congress to unconstitutionally 
delegate. Nondelegation opponents claim that the status quo is ac-
ceptable. Each claim either that weak nondelegation is not support-
able by the Constitution, case law, or public policy, or that it is not 
judicially manageable. Nonetheless, weak nondelegation can be de-
fended against criticism from both sides. Moreover, not only does 
the American Trucking majority decision support weak nondelega-
tion, additional judicial support can be found in Judge Tatel’s dissent 
and in earlier Supreme Court and D.C. Circuit case law. 
 
 
 120. See id. 
 121. See supra notes 91-99, 116-119 and accompanying text. 
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1. Addressing strong nondelegation supporters 
a. Strong nondelegation supporters’ arguments against weak 
nondelegation. Supporters of strong nondelegation are the most vig-
orous opponents of weak nondelegation. They believe that it is un-
constitutional for Congress to delegate any legislative power to an-
other branch; and, if it does delegate legislative power, Congress 
must articulate an intelligible principle.122 These parties argue that, 
because the weak nondelegation doctrine requires that agencies, not 
Congress, propose intelligible principles to limit their own discre-
tion, the weak nondelegation doctrine does not satisfy the Constitu-
tion. No matter what an agency is required to do, if Congress is al-
lowed to delegate legislative authority without at least articulating an 
intelligible principle, then Congress has violated the Constitution. 
The goals of strong nondelegation include promoting (1) more 
effective decision making, (2) better public policy, (3) greater con-
gressional responsibility, (4) greater congressional accountability, (5) 
more democratic government, and (6) protection of liberty.123 Weak 
nondelegation does not accomplish what some see as the strong 
nondelegation doctrine’s most important goal, promoting congres-
sional accountability for difficult policy choices.124 Because weak 
nondelegation allows Congress to delegate broad policymaking 
power to agencies, Congress can still avoid making difficult policy 
choices. The fact that the weak nondelegation doctrine requires 
agencies to place limits on their own discretion to make difficult de-
cisions does not make elected officials more accountable for the deci-
sions. 
These parties also argue that weak nondelegation cannot accom-
plish another of the doctrine’s primary goals, promoting better deci-
sion making.125 In response, weak nondelegation doctrine supporters 
 
 122. See, e.g., SCHOENBROD, supra note 3; BARBER, supra note 25. 
 123. See SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 12-18; Schoenbrod, Could the Court Give it 
Substance, supra note 93, at 1238. But see Richard B. Stewart, Beyond Delegation Doctrine, 36 
AM. U. L. REV. 323, 329-35 (1987) (arguing that enforcing the traditional nondelegation 
doctrine might simply cause Congress to delegate greater decision-making power to congres-
sional subcommittees, which could produce even worse results than agency decision making). 
 124. See, e.g., BARBER, supra note 25, at 40-41 (arguing Congress cannot delegate deci-
sion-making power in an attempt to avoid making substantive decisions); SCHOENBROD, supra 
note 3, at 13-20. 
 125. See generally SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 82-96, 101-06, 109-31 (noting prob-
lems with delegations of legislative power and with agency decision making in general that 
minimal nondelegation could not likely overcome). 
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argue that limiting agency discretion leads to better decisions be-
cause the agency must select its decision from a range of reasonable 
alternatives.126 Commentators, however, have pointed to several as-
pects of agency decision making that call into question whether 
agencies can ever be trusted to make good public policy decisions.127 
Agency capture theory, for instance, would counsel against giving 
agencies the responsibility to limit their own power.128 According to 
this argument, if the agency decision-making process is inherently 
flawed, then allowing agencies to make decisions limiting their dis-
cretion is not going to lead to better final decisions. 
b. Weak nondelegation should nonetheless be acceptable to strong 
nondelegation supporters. For the reasons that follow, strong non-
delegation supporters should support weak nondelegation, despite 
the opposing arguments discussed above. The problem strong non-
delegation supporters face is that strong nondelegation is unwork-
able because courts repeatedly refuse to apply it. Not surprisingly, 
Congress has shown no willingness to stop delegating, and courts 
have shown no inclination to force Congress not to do so.129 Judge 
Silberman of the D.C. Circuit aptly described the situation when he 
wrote that the Supreme Court “has acknowledged only a theoretical 
limitation on the scope of congressional delegations.”130 Until this 
situation changes, which it should, strong nondelegation supporters 
should support steps, even small steps, which move the situation in 
the direction they want to go. Weak nondelegation may not achieve 
the ultimate goal of strong nondelegation supporters, but it does 
lead toward their objectives. 
Some commentators have advocated striving for the next best al-
ternative since it is impracticable to expect abandonment of the ad-
ministrative state in its current form.131 Given weak nondelegation’s 
obvious lack of doctrinal foundation—it accomplishes practical goals 
but does not square with the strong nondelegation doctrine’s consti-
 
 126. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:15, at 206. 
 127. See BARBER, supra note 25, at 3; SCHOENBROD, supra note 3, at 119-34. 
 128. See Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 
HARV. L. REV. 1669, 1683-85 (1975) (explaining various views on agency capture theory). 
 129. See DAVIS, supra note 9, §§ 3:2, 3:15, at 215-16. 
 130. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Silber-
man, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), denying reh’g, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (per curiam). 
 131. See Lawson, supra note 20, at 1252-53. 
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tutional basis—the theory of the second best may provide the best 
support for weak nondelegation. This theory suggests “if an incor-
rect precedent creates a constitutional disequilibrium, it is foolish to 
proceed as though one were still in an equilibrium state.”132 Since 
strong nondelegation supporters believe that incorrect precedent has 
caused the current situation’s disequilibrium, they should embrace 
the opportunity to correct that disequilibrium. The theory of the 
second best has been used to support the establishment of institu-
tions, such as the legislative veto, to compensate for the current ac-
ceptance of the delegation principle.133 The argument applies just as 
well to weak nondelegation because it could limit agencies’ discre-
tion and thereby approximate a more constitutionally acceptable 
situation. 
In addition, weak nondelegation, despite its constitutional weak-
nesses, accomplishes some of strong nondelegation’s most important 
goals, goals that move toward a constitutional equilibrium. The 
American Trucking majority stated that the technique applied in that 
case (weak nondelegation) satisfied “two out of three rationales for 
the nondelegation doctrine.”134 First, weak nondelegation reduces 
the likelihood of undesirable, arbitrary agency decisions.135 While 
criticizing the panel’s decision in American Trucking, Judge Silber-
man agreed that the scope of administrators’ discretion is a “legiti-
mate concern of the nondelegation doctrine.”136 Second, weak non-
delegation “[e]nhance[s] the likelihood that meaningful judicial 
review will prove feasible.”137 For instance, a reviewing court can 
more easily determine whether an agency’s decision is reasonable if it 
can readily identify the bounds within which the agency must make 
its decision. 
 
 
 
 132. Id. at 1253. 
 133. See id. at 1252-53. 
 134. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1038 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), 
reh’g denied, 195 F.3d (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 135. See id.; DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:15, at 206, 208, 215 (The nondelegation doc-
trine’s purpose should be, and can be, effectively used to “protect private parties against injus-
tice on account of unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power.” Id. at 208.). 
 136. American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 14 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Silber-
man, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc), denying reh’g, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 
1999) (per curiam). 
 137. American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1038. 
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The weak nondelegation doctrine does not, however, ensure that 
Congress makes “important choices of social policy.”138 In further 
criticizing the panel’s majority decision, Judge Silberman stated that 
the majority’s approach would allow Congress “to delegate almost 
limitless policymaking authority to an agency, so long as the agency 
provides and consistently applies an ‘intelligible principle.’”139 Sil-
berman’s criticism has merit, but he must realize, indeed he ac-
knowledged earlier in his dissent, that Congress already delegates 
this way and agencies already possess and exercise almost limitless 
policymaking authority.140 Therefore, it simply cannot be argued that 
weak nondelegation will cause improper delegations. Surely, if courts 
will not stop Congress from delegating broadly to agencies, then 
courts should at least take steps to ensure that agencies who receive 
such broad delegations narrow their own discretion within reason-
able bounds. The goals that the weak nondelegation doctrine does 
accomplish are not insignificant, and weak nondelegation should not 
be discounted simply because it does not accomplish all the goals 
that strong nondelegation supporters desire. 
2. Addressing nondelegation opponents 
a. Weak nondelegation should be acceptable to nondelegation 
opponents. Nondelegation opponents typically oppose the strong 
nondelegation doctrine for functional reasons. The weak nondelega-
tion doctrine, however, satisfies many of these functional concerns. 
The weak nondelegation doctrine is judicially manageable, politically 
feasible, and accomplishes goals that even nondelegation opponents 
should appreciate. 
 (1) Weak nondelegation is more judicially manageable than 
strong nondelegation. The weak nondelegation doctrine suffers from 
one of the strong nondelegation doctrine’s main problems—
identifying when a delegation of legislative authority exists is very 
difficult because there is no clear definition of legislative power.141 
This concern, however, is less troublesome for the weak nondelega-
tion doctrine and therefore makes the doctrine more judicially man-
ageable. The difficulty in identifying an unacceptable delegation is 
 
 138. Id. 
 139. American Trucking Ass’ns, 195 F.3d at 15. 
 140. See id. at 14. 
 141. See Pierce, supra note 94, at 398-403. 
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less troublesome because the weak nondelegation doctrine does not 
force the reviewing court to make the difficult choice of upholding 
the delegation or declaring the statute unconstitutional. Given 
courts’ aversion to invalidating statutes, courts faced with this choice 
have found it difficult to honestly apply the doctrine that would 
likely have led them to hold many statutes unconstitutional.142 When 
given the weak doctrine’s less drastic choice, that of approving the 
statute and the agency’s interpretation or remanding for the agency 
to declare an intelligible principle, courts will be more able to apply 
honestly the weak nondelegation standard.143 
 (2) Weak nondelegation is more politically feasible than strong 
nondelegation. It is arguable that strong nondelegation will never be 
applied because it is politically infeasible. First, nondelegation oppo-
nents argue that the federal government could not function if Con-
gress lacked the ability to broadly delegate legislative authority.144 In 
addition, since a broad coalition of interests benefits from broad 
delegations—for example, in different situations both industry and 
environmental interests can advance their agendas when agencies re-
ceive broad delegations—it is entirely possible that courts will never 
choose to stir the hornets’ nest by applying strong nondelegation.145 
Finally, application of strong nondelegation would arguably not pro-
duce optimal results. For instance, whatever strategy Congress em-
ployed to avoid offending the doctrine—such as delegating increas-
ing authority to congressional subcommittees to formulate the more 
detailed legislation required by the strong doctrine—would be less 
desirable than the current situation.146 The weak nondelegation doc-
trine avoids these possible pitfalls. 
 (3) Nondelegation opponents should appreciate the goals that 
weak nondelegation can accomplish. All but the most ardent and blind 
supporters of agency power should recognize the desirability of 
limiting the power and discretion of a government body that is not 
directly accountable to the public. The weak nondelegation doctrine  
 142. The Supreme Court’s self-deceptive techniques of denying the existence of delega-
tions and then of identifying congressionally provided intelligible principles demonstrate that 
the Court has never honestly applied the strong nondelegation doctrine. See DAVIS, supra note 
9, §§ 3:5, 3:6; Stewart, supra note 123, at 328. 
 143. The identification and advocation of particular standards is beyond this Note’s 
scope. See supra note 94. 
 144. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:3; Stewart, supra note 123, at 329-35. 
 145. See Stewart, supra note 123, at 328. 
 146. See id. at 329-35 (arguing that subdelegation to congressional subcommittees would 
be worse than delegation to agencies). 
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rectly accountable to the public. The weak nondelegation doctrine 
helps impose such limits.147 
b. At least one prominent nondelegation opponent already supports 
weak nondelegation. Kenneth Culp Davis, an outspoken critic of 
strong nondelegation, enunciated a nondelegation theory that in-
cludes characteristics of weak nondelegation.148 Davis’s argument is 
essentially functional, arguing that the nondelegation doctrine 
should be structured to accomplish important practical goals and not 
to accommodate a doctrinal preference.149 
According to Davis, administrative standards can limit agency 
discretion and reduce agency arbitrariness just as effectively as statu-
tory standards.150 Additionally, Davis argued that his theory is prefer-
able because (1) legislators often cannot or will not provide statutory 
standards required by strong nondelegation, (2) courts have been 
unwilling to force Congress to stop delegating, and (3) courts can 
force agencies to establish those standards.151 For instance, Davis ar-
gued that courts could require agencies to engage in rulemaking to 
establish necessary standards, guides, rules, limits, and procedures.152  
The proposition that courts can force an agency to articulate 
standards to limit the agency’s discretion has been supported by In-
ternational Union, UAW v. OSHA (“Lockout/Tagout I & II”)153 and 
American Trucking.154 One could argue, however, that these cases 
only establish that when courts require agency standards, agencies 
will simply propose almost equally broad interpretations of the gov-
 
 147. See supra notes 129-140 and accompanying text. 
 148. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:15. Davis identified five steps (only four of which are 
relevant here) to create an effective nondelegation doctrine: 
(a) the purpose of the non-delegation doctrine should [be] . . . protecting against 
unnecessary and uncontrolled discretionary power; (b) the exclusive focus on stan-
dards should be shifted to an emphasis more on safeguards than on standards; (c) 
when legislative bodies have failed to provide standards, the courts . . . should re-
quire that the administrators must . . . supply the standards; (d) the non-delegation 
doctrine should . . . [require] officers with discretionary power . . . to structure their 
discretion through appropriate safeguards and to confine and guide their discretion 
through standards, principles, and rules. 
Id. But see Schoenbrod, Could the Court Give it Substance, supra note 94, at 9. 
 149. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:15. 
 150. See id. at 211. 
 151. See id. 
 152. See id. at 214. 
 153. See infra Part IV.A.3.b. 
 154. See supra Part III.B.3. 
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erning statute. This does not have to be the case, though. If courts 
stand their ground, require meaningful limits, and actually take ac-
tion when they are not satisfied, then agencies will likely comply. 
There are, however, differences between weak nondelegation as 
proposed by this Note and as proposed by Davis’s theory. For in-
stance, Davis would place greater emphasis on procedural safeguards 
and less emphasis on standards.155 Davis therefore places great weight 
on the administrative decision-making procedures used. He gives 
procedure such weight because, he argues, procedures can reduce 
arbitrariness in administrative decisions, which is the nondelegation 
doctrine’s goal.156 This Note, however, does not go so far as to argue 
that procedures, however important, should replace substantive 
standards and limitations in this context. Notably, by denying re-
hearing on the nondelegation issue, the D.C. Circuit indicated that 
it did not accept Davis’s procedural safeguards approach.157 
Not only can weak nondelegation be defended against both 
strong nondelegation supporters and nondelegation opponents, the 
weak nondelegation doctrine is also supported by various judicial 
sources. 
3. Judicial support for weak nondelegation 
a. Judge Tatel’s American Trucking dissent supports weak 
nondelegation. Notwithstanding his disagreement with the result, 
Judge Tatel’s dissent in American Trucking supports both an essen-
tial premise underlying weak nondelegation and use of the doctrine. 
Tatel opposed the majority’s decision to remand the ozone and PM 
NAAQS to the EPA and to require the agency to articulate an intel-
ligible principle. Tatel based this opposition on two grounds. First, 
the Supreme Court has repeatedly upheld delegations giving agen-
cies broader discretion than the CAA gives in this situation.158 Sec-
ond, the CAA effectively confined the EPA’s discretion.159 Tatel also  
 
 
 155. See generally DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:15. 
 156. See id. at 209. 
 157. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 8 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), deny-
ing reh’g, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 158. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 175 F.3d 1027, 1057 (D.C. Cir.) (per cu-
riam), reh’g denied, 195 F.3d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 159. See id. 
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cited Lockout/Tagout II160 as an example of a decision in which the 
D.C. Circuit upheld constraints on agency discretion that were no 
more significant than the limits on the EPA’s discretion to promul-
gate PM and ozone NAAQS. 
Despite his disagreement with the result, Tatel did not disagree 
with the premise that statutes sometimes delegate excessive discre-
tion to agencies. Tatel cited Lockout/Tagout I161 to distinguish sec-
tion 109 of the CAA from the standard at issue in Lockout/Tagout I 
& II, section 3(8) of the Occupation Safety and Health Act (“OSH 
Act”).162 Tatel, however, never questioned the court’s holding in 
Lockout/Tagout I that the Occupational Safety and Health Admini-
stration’s (“OSHA”) interpretation of section 3(8) qualified as an 
improper delegation.163 Since he relied on and did not disagree with 
the holding in Lockout/Tagout I, one can infer that he agreed with 
the holding and with the general proposition that improper delega-
tions actually exist and are not simply a legal fiction that courts talk 
about but never actually recognize.164 
Moreover, Tatel’s dissent arguably accepts the use of weak non-
delegation. First, his dissent disagreed with how the majority applied 
the doctrine but did not argue against the doctrine itself.165 For in-
stance, he did not disagree with weak nondelegation’s premise that 
 
 160. International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) [hereinafter Lock-
out/Tagout II] (discussed infra Part IV.A.3.b.). 
 161. International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1991) [herein-
after Lockout/Tagout I] (discussed infra Part IV.A.3.b.). 
 162. See American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1058. 
 163. See Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1317-18. 
 164. It would be reasonable, however, given Tatel’s analysis of why the EPA’s interpreta-
tion of section 109 is not unconstitutional notwithstanding Lockout/Tagout I, to take Tatel’s 
dissent as support for the allowance of nearly unlimited delegations. Tatel actually offers a fa-
cially persuasive argument, but on closer examination it is difficult to accept the argument that 
section 3(8)’s mandate to establish standards “reasonably necessary or appropriate to provide 
safe” workplaces is significantly different from section 109’s mandate to establish standards 
“‘requisite’ to protect the public health.” American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1058 (quot-
ing 42 U.S.C. § 7409(b)(1) (1994); Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1316). “Requisite,” even 
with the other purported constraints contained in the CAA does not seem significantly more 
precise than “reasonably necessary or appropriate.” Id. Tatel focuses on “requisite” in contrast 
to “reasonably requisite” as if it were intuitively clear what standard is “requisite” to protect 
public health and as if the addition of “reasonably” hurls the inquiry into an abyss from which 
no answer can be derived. See id. at 1058-59. Tatel’s argument that the interpretation accepted 
by the court in Lockout/Tagout II is similar to the EPA’s interpretation of section 109 seems 
more reasonable. See id. at 1059. 
 165. See American Trucking Ass’ns, 175 F.3d at 1057-61. 
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courts can and should remand regulations and require agencies to 
articulate intelligible principles limiting the agencies’ discretion. Ad-
ditionally, Tatel’s reliance on Lockout/Tagout I & II further supports 
the weak doctrine because the D.C. Circuit applied weak nondelega-
tion in those cases (albeit leaving the threshold very low), and he did 
not express any dissatisfaction with that approach. Therefore, al-
though Tatel disagrees with the majority’s result in American Truck-
ing, his dissent did not argue against the principle of weak nondele-
gation in general.166 
b. The United States Supreme Court’s and the D.C. Circuit’s 
recent nondelegation decisions support weak nondelegation. The Su-
preme Court and the D.C. Circuit have both issued opinions in the 
last several years that indicate a willingness to adopt and, most im-
portantly, enforce weak nondelegation. Most notably, Mistretta v. 
United States,167 Industrial Union Department v. American Petro-
leum Institute (“Benzene”),168 and Lockout/Tagout I & II169 support 
this proposition. 
Mistretta indirectly supports weak nondelegation. First, Mis-
tretta, like so many cases before it, explicitly authorizes some delega-
tions of legislative power.170 Second, Mistretta supports limiting 
delegatees’ discretion.171 Although Mistretta could be interpreted to 
reinforce strong nondelegation because under the Court’s case law 
the statute at issue provided an intelligible principle,172 this argument 
more likely demonstrates that strong nondelegation does not work. 
Even with the laundry list of factors and limitations imposed by the 
statute, Congress left the Sentencing Commission with incredibly 
broad authority to make important public policy choices.173 The 
 
 166. In fact, Tatel’s dissent argued the EPA’s decision should be upheld because the 
“EPA actually adhered to a disciplined decision-making process.” Id. at 1059. See also Ameri-
can Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 15 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam) (Silberman, J., dissent-
ing), denying reh’g, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). This resembles Kenneth 
Culp Davis’s argument that courts should ensure the presence of administrative safeguards 
rather than statutory standards. See DAVIS, supra note 9, § 3:15; discussion supra Part 
IV.A.2.b. 
 167. 488 U.S. 361 (1989). 
 168. 448 U.S. 607 (1980) (plurality opinion). 
 169. International Union v. OSHA, 938 F.2d 1310 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (“Lockout/Tagout 
I”); International Union v. OSHA, 37 F.3d 665 (D.C. Cir. 1994) (“Lockout/Tagout II”). 
 170. See Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 372-73. 
 171. See id. at 372, 379. 
 172. See id. at 373-76. 
 173. See id. 
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Court’s desire to constrain discretion and inability or unwillingness 
to accomplish that goal using strong nondelegation supports adop-
tion of a new theory. Mistretta supports weak nondelegation because 
weak nondelegation, unlike strong nondelegation, allows the Court 
to constrain delegatees’ discretion and does not require the Court to 
disallow all delegations, a step the Court has been, and continues to 
be, unwilling to take. 
In addition, although the Court did not actually apply weak 
nondelegation, the Supreme Court’s plurality in Benzene supports 
the principles underlying weak nondelegation. At issue in Benzene 
were OSHA’s regulations regarding occupational exposure to ben-
zene. The American Petroleum Institute challenged the regulations 
as unconstitutional delegations of legislative power. The plurality 
held that OSHA’s interpretation of section 6(b)(5) of the OSH Act 
gave the agency unlimited discretion to regulate industries to the 
brink of economic ruin in order to remove all potential health haz-
ards from the workplace.174 However, the plurality did not hold that 
the statute unconstitutionally delegated, but instead remanded 
OSHA’s regulations, requiring the agency to comply with the prin-
ciple identified by the Court.175 The principle required OSHA to find 
that a hazard poses a “significant risk” to workers before regulating 
that hazard.176 
Benzene did not apply weak nondelegation because the Court, 
rather than the agency, articulated the intelligible principle, but this 
opinion nonetheless supports weak nondelegation.177 Weak nondele-
gation limits agencies’ discretion within reasonable bounds notwith-
standing the limitless statutes under which the agencies operate. This 
opinion supports the principles underlying weak nondelegation be-
cause the plurality agreed that an agency’s discretion should be lim-
ited when that agency receives a broad legislative mandate.178 The 
approach was different, but the underlying principle and the result 
support weak nondelegation.179 
 
 174. See Industrial Union Dep’t, 448 U.S. at 641. 
 175. See id. at 662. 
 176. See id. at 639. 
 177. See id. at 639. 
 178. See id. at 645-46. 
 179. Note also Justice Rehnquist’s concurrence wherein he argued for application of 
strong nondelegation and identified three factors, of which the D.C. Circuit stated that their  
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As indicated previously, the D.C. Circuit applied weak nondele-
gation in Lockout/Tagout I & II.180 In Lockout/Tagout I, the D.C. 
Circuit accepted the National Association of Manufacturers’ 
(“NAM”) argument that OSHA’s interpretation of section 3(8) of 
the OSH Act gave the agency unlimited discretion to promulgate 
regulations.181 The D.C. Circuit held that OSHA’s interpretation of 
the statute violated the nondelegation doctrine because it gave the 
agency discretion to regulate any industry to the brink of economic 
collapse or to not regulate at all.182 Because a reasonable alternative 
interpretation existed, the court remanded the regulations to OSHA 
with instructions to adopt an interpretation of section 3(8) that lim-
ited OSHA’s discretion.183 By requiring that the agency articulate the 
intelligible principle, the D.C. Circuit applied weak nondelegation. 
In Lockout/Tagout II, the NAM asked the D.C. Circuit to hold 
that OSHA’s revised interpretation of section 3(8) failed to ade-
quately limit the agency’s discretion and that OSHA’s interpretation 
therefore violated the nondelegation doctrine.184 OSHA’s new regu-
lations interpreted the OSH Act as requiring that regulations under 
section 3(8) provide a “‘high degree of worker protection.’”185 The 
court held that this interpretation provided a sufficient constraint on 
the agency’s discretion and satisfied the nondelegation doctrine.186 
By upholding the intelligible principle articulated by the agency, the 
D.C. Circuit upheld its prior use of weak nondelegation. 
B. The Practical Consequences 
Finally, this Note considers the practical consequences of the 
American Trucking decision. The first question is whether the EPA 
can articulate an intelligible principle that will satisfy the D.C. Cir-
cuit. It is entirely possible that the EPA based the ozone and PM 
 
approach satisfied two. See id. at 685 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); discussion supra Part 
IV.A.1.b. 
 180. See Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d 1310 (1991); Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d 665 
(1994). 
 181. See Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1313, 1316; see also, Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d 
at 668. 
 182. See Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1317-18. 
 183. See id. (quoting 58 Fed. Reg. 16,612, 16,615). 
 184. See Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 667-68. 
 185. Id. at 669. 
 186. See id. 
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NAAQS on an intelligible principle. It is possible that on remand the 
EPA might be able to articulate those principles with more clarity 
than they were able to in the proposed rules, the final rules, their 
briefs, or at oral argument. If the EPA revises their regulations and 
the new standards are litigated, the court may find that the new 
standards articulate an intelligible principle. In that case, American 
Trucking would end up much like Lockout/Tagout I & II.187 How-
ever, some commentators have argued that since ozone and PM are 
nonthreshold pollutants and since the EPA cannot consider eco-
nomic costs in establishing NAAQS, the EPA may have serious prob-
lems and may be unable to articulate an intelligible principle.188 
Since the D.C. Circuit has denied the EPA’s petition for rehear-
ing and petition for rehearing en banc on the nondelegation issue, 
those options are no longer available to the agency. In their petition 
for rehearing, the EPA identified a principle on which they claimed 
the regulations were based and argued that it qualified as an intelli-
gible principle.189 The panel did not express whether the agency’s 
claimed principle would be acceptable on remand, leaving the agency 
the option of articulating that principle in new regulations.190 
Even if the EPA can articulate such a principle, another question 
is whether the EPA will do so. It seems unreasonable for the EPA to 
refuse to promulgate new rules if they believe that they have a satis-
factory principle. The EPA, however, has a tremendous stake in the 
nondelegation issue because it affects almost every action they take 
under the many statutes that authorize their actions. The EPA is very 
serious about establishing new ozone and particulate matter stan-
dards and probably does not want to waste time and money promul-
gating standards that might be struck down.191 The EPA may there-
fore choose to litigate in order to obtain a more clear answer as to 
the standard to which they will be held. Moreover, the EPA may be-
lieve that any attempt to articulate a standard will simply lead to fur-
ther litigation, as in Lockout/Tagout I & II, and that an immediate 
 
 187. See Lockout/Tagout I, 938 F.2d at 1326; Lockout/Tagout II, 37 F.3d at 668. 
 188. See David M. Friedland & David M. Williamson, D.C. Circuit Strikes Down Ozone 
and Particulate Matter Rules, METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNSEL (Mid-Atlantic Firms), July 
1999, at 8, available in Westlaw, Legal Newspapers, METCC. 
 189. See American Trucking Ass’ns v. EPA, 195 F.3d 4, 6-7 (D.C. Cir.) (per curiam), 
denying reh’g, 175 F.3d 1027 (D.C. Cir. 1999) (per curiam). 
 190. See id. 
 191. See Friedland & Williamson, supra note 188, at 8. 
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appeal to the Supreme Court will bring them to the same ultimate 
result in a shorter time and with less effort. 
If the EPA cannot or does not articulate a satisfactory principle, 
the next question is whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari. 
First, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court would allow the D.C. 
Circuit to significantly modify the EPA’s operations under a statute 
as prominent as the CAA without reviewing the case.192 Moreover, 
given the Supreme Court’s current composition and its recent trend 
in nondelegation cases,193 the time may be right for the Court to lay 
down a more definite nondelegation standard.194 The fact that the 
Supreme Court decided FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco 
Corp.195 indicates the Court’s willingness to address delegation is-
sues, which may indicate a willingness to hear American Trucking.  
The Court’s decision in Brown & Williamson indicates that the 
Court may not allow the broad delegations at issue in American 
Trucking. The issue in Brown & Williamson was whether the FDA 
could regulate tobacco products without an express delegation of 
such power by Congress to the FDA in the Food, Drug, and Cos-
metic Act (“FDCA”) or in any other statute.196 The Court held that 
the FDA could not regulate tobacco under the current statutory 
scheme.197 Although the Court did not go so far as to hold that the 
FDA could not regulate tobacco without an express delegation of 
such power, this holding does indicate that in some contexts the ma-
jority is unwilling to broadly interpret delegations of legislative 
power.198 
 
 192. See id. 
 193. See, Friedland & Williamson, supra note 188, at 8; see, e.g., FDA v. Brown & Wil-
liamson Tobacco Corp., __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 1291. 
 194. See Schoenbrod, Could the Court Give it Substance, supra note 94, at 1234-35 (not-
ing the support given to the nondelegation doctrine by various Justices); Friedland & William-
son, supra note 188, at 8. 
 195. __ U.S. __, 120 S. Ct. 1291 (2000). 
 196. See id. at 1297. 
 197.  See id. at 1297, 1301. 
 198. The majority’s holding focused primarily on how Congress’ established statutory 
scheme actually precludes the FDA’s regulation of tobacco rather than on whether the FDA 
could so regulate without an express grant of authority. Id. at 1297, 1301, 1309, 1312-13 
(Illustrating how the statutory scheme established by Congress indicates Congress’ intent to 
preclude regulation of tobacco by the FDA). This focus lessens somewhat the applicability of 
this holding to American Trucking, but the Court did state that “an administrative agency’s 
power to regulate in the public interest must always be grounded in a valid grant of authority 
from Congress” and that there had been no such grant. Id. at 1315. Perhaps more important 
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V. CONCLUSION 
Congress often delegates broad policymaking powers to agen-
cies. Strong nondelegation limits Congress’ ability to make such 
delegations. Weak nondelegation, on the other hand, requires an 
agency receiving such a delegation to articulate an intelligible princi-
ple to guide its exercise of discretion. Because courts refuse to apply 
strong nondelegation, agencies that receive broad statutory mandates 
are able to exercise nearly unlimited discretion. Courts should there-
fore limit agencies’ discretion by applying weak nondelegation.   
Weak nondelegation is a workable and desirable option both to 
nondelegation and to the status quo.  Weak nondelegation does not 
accomplish all of the objectives of strong nondelegation, but weak 
nondelegation is more workable and may provide a step toward 
eventual application of a constitutionally consistent doctrine, possibly 
a doctrine that actually prohibits many or all delegations of legislative 
power. Weak nondelegation seeks greater administrative accountabil-
ity and better administrative decision making. It is likely that neither 
strong nondelegation supporters nor nondelegation critics will be 
completely satisfied with weak nondelegation. Nonetheless, because 
Congress will not stop delegating and courts will not apply strong 
nondelegation, courts should adopt the weak nondelegation doc-
trine. It is the best option because it is better to control agencies’ 
discretion than to insist on a doctrine that courts do not and possibly 
will never apply. 
Gabriel Clark∗ 
 
 
to the American Trucking debate is the majority’s rejection of the dissent’s argument. The 
dissent’s argument is framed much like older nondelegation cases. For instance, the dissent 
cited cases in which the Court had upheld broad delegations. See id. at 1318 (citing United 
States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S. 157 (1968) and Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 
390 U.S. 747 (1968)). The dissent also argued that the FDCA should be interpreted broadly 
because broad delegations are necessary in order to give agencies the flexibility they need to 
accomplish goals that they see fit. See id. at 1325-26. Thus, the fact that the majority did not 
adopt such a prodelegation stance in Brown & Williamson indicates that the Court may not 
uphold the broad delegations at issue in American Trucking, but the fact that the Court was 
able to base its decision on the presence of an entire congressional regulatory scheme means 
that Brown & Williamson is probably not a completely accurate predictor of how the Court 
would decide American Trucking. 
 ∗ The author would like to thank Bryan Elwood for his help on drafts of this Note 
and Steve Christiansen and Baruch Fellner for their helpful insights on this topic. 
